Establishment exposure to crime is a frequent occurrence and a severe impediment to business operation in developing economies. We present a simple theory for the frequency and severity of crime across establishment size and evaluate its central predictions using micro-data. We find that high expectation of crime at the establishment level is strongly associated with lower sales, labor and capital. Consistent with our theory, crime has a differential role across size and is less prevalent among the smallest and largest establishments. When evaluated relative to major distortions to production highlighted in developing economies, crime remains important for explaining establishment size.
Introduction
Establishment exposure to crime is highly prevalent in developing countries and can have adverse effects on business performance. According to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) 2010 crime is most severe in South America where over 40 percent of establishments report crime, theft and disorder is a major obstacle to business operation, higher than what is reported in all other continents. Importantly, there is considerable heterogeneity in establishment exposure to crime and related losses, both across and within countries. 1 For instance, in Brazil close to 40 percent of establishments report at least one incident related to crime in the previous year and average losses are about 7 percent of annual sales; in Colombia, corresponding values are approximately 30 and 1 percent. The prevalence of crime can have strategic implications for factors used in production--e.g. invest less and operate on a smaller scale (Svensson 1998 )--and have differential effects across establishments if the severity of crime varies across the size distribution. Our focus is to provide a simple framework to analyze the importance of crime on and across establishment size, and evaluate the evidence using micro-data in South America.
Our theory incorporates a channel for crime into an otherwise standard framework of heterogeneous producers. Establishments use capital in production and face a probability a share of its capital is lost to crime. Those that use more capital in production are a more lucrative target for crime, though spending on private protection lowers the probability of facing crime. Our theory provides two testable predictions that we take to the data: (1) higher expected losses from crime lowers establishment size and (2) crime has differential effects across size where the smallest and largest establishments are less affected by crime than medium size ones. Intuitively, establishments strategically under-produce to minimize losses from crime. Large establishments are less affected by crime because they spend a lot on private protection which lowers anticipated losses, and small establishments use little capital in production. Invariably, medium size establishments are most affected by crime.
We test these predictions using micro-level data on establishment production and other relevant characteristics from the WBES 2010 for countries in South America. Included are establishment responses to whether crime, theft and disorder is an obstacle to business operation, taking a range of five possible values, which we refer to as crime expectation. This is particularly relevant for our analysis because crime expectation reflects an establishment's perception of its exposure to crime and severity on business operation. Moreover, it can capture strategic responses to crime that incidence or losses from crime fail to account for. For instance, establishments that anticipate substantial disruption or losses from crime may lower inputs in production even though subsequently they do not face crime. By using crime expectation we can account for the broader effects of crime among the entire sample of establishments, including non-victims of crime.
With a full-set of controls we find that high crime expectation is associated with 20 percent lower sales and 12 percent fewer full-time employees, relative to low crime expectation establishments. Consistent with our theory we find crime expectation has a differential role across size. In particular, the smallest and largest establishments (below 10 and more than 250 employees, respectively) are less influenced by high crime expectation than other establishments, and we find similar patterns for other definitions of size as well. Of course, crime expectation can be affected by unobserved factors at the establishment level that would bias our results. The data we use prevent us from providing a compelling exogenous measure for crime expectation, so instead we evaluate a reduced form version using average crime expectation at the country-industry-city level as an additional check. 2 Consistent with our previous results, reduced form estimates support the central predictions form our theory: crime expectation is associated with lower establishment size, and this association is strongest for medium-size establishments.
This paper relates to a small empirical literature that evaluates the importance of crime on establishment outcomes. Amin (2009) finds that large establishments are more likely to face crime but have lower losses as a percentage of sales than small establishments. Ben-Yishay and Pearlman (2014) and , using data for micro-enterprises in Mexico, find that crime incidence lowers establishment growth. Our work differs from these papers in several respects. First, we focus on all establishments across the size distribution, instead of only micro establishments, which allow us to evaluate the differential role crime has across establishment size. 3 Second, we emphasize crime expectation to account for the broader effects of crime, including non-victims whose behavior may still be adversely affected by crime. Gaviria (2002) also emphasizes crime expectation (or crime perception) using early versions of the WBES. Finally, focusing on crime expectation allows us to evaluate the importance of crime relative to other obstacles to business performance highlighted in the literature by taking advantage of the wide-ranging scope of the WBES.
Our work also relates to the misallocation literature that emphasises distortions to production are important for understanding productivity and establishment size differences between rich and poor countries countries (Banerjee and Duflo 2005; Guner, Ventura, and Xu 2008; Hsieh and Klenow 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson 2008) . We emphasise the importance of crime as a mechanism for understanding these differences whereby establishments strategically under-produce to avoid losses from crime. 4 Access to finance, the informal sector and corruption are also important distortions highlighted in the literature for understanding establishment underperformance in poor countries (Buera, Kaboski, and Shin 2011; LaPorta and Shleifer 2014; Shleifer and Vishny 1998) . A convenient feature of using WBES data is that we can evaluate the importance of crime relative to these distortions. Using 'expectation' measures for access to finance, informal sector and corruption in our regressions, we find crime expectation remains negatively associated with measures related to establishment size and in some instances is statistically and quantitatively more important. These results highlight that lowering crime may be one of the more important policy reforms for spurring establishment expansion.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides country-level evidence related to crime in South America. In Section 3 we present a framework that incorporates a channel for crime and generates testable predictions. Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 outlines our empirical strategy. The role of crime on establishment outcomes, how they vary across size, and its importance relative to other distortions are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Facts Related to Crime
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) provides establishment-level data related to major obstacles businesses face in day-to-day operations. Included are questions related to crime: its frequency, losses attributed to it (as a percentage of sales and in absolute terms) and a ranking of its severity. We leave discussion on the particulars of the dataset to Section 4 and focus here on key facts related to crime at the country level. While crime-related data is available for over 100 countries, we restrict attention to crime in South America where it is most severe and to limit institutional differences in our cross-country comparisons (Gaviria 2002; Kisunko, Brunetti, and Weder 1999) . Table 1 reports key measures related to establishment-level crime in South America based on the WBES 2010. Column 2 reports the percentage of establishments that report incidences related to arson, robbery, theft or vandalism on their premises in the past year (henceforth crime). A notable fact from Table 1 is that crime is a frequent occurrence in South America. In most countries, over 35 percent of establishments report at least one incidence of crime on their premises in the past year--establishments in Peru report the fewest incidences (24 percent of surveyed establishments) and establishments in Chile report the most (48 percent). A high fre-quency of crime however may not imply it is a severe constraint to business operation. To gauge its severity, establishments are asked to rate whether crime, theft and disorder is not a problem, a minor problem, a moderate problem, a major or a severe problem--in what follows we use this as a measure for establishment-level crime expectation. 5 The third column in Table 1 reports the percentage of establishments that report crime is a major or severe (henceforth major) obstacle to business operation. In all countries, over a quarter of establishments report crime is a major obstacle to business operation, with values as high as 60 and 70 percent in Venezuela and Brazil. To put these numbers in context, establishments that report crime is a major obstacle to business operation in three developed countries--Germany, Korea and Ireland--range from 1 to 5 percent. 6 Finally, column 4 reports average losses from crime as a percentage of sales for all establishments and column 5 reports this same statistic among establishments that experienced crime. Losses due to crime are a non-trivial share of sales, especially among establishments that experienced crime. For example, in Ecuador average losses are 3.4 percent of annual sales among establishments that are victims of crime, and 1 percent for the country as a whole. The second through fifth columns report the percentage of establishments that report incidences related to crime in the past year, the percentage of establishments that report crime is a major obstacle to business operation and average losses due to crime as percentage of sales (among all establishments and contingent on facing crime). All country statistics are from 2010 except for Brazil which is from WBES 2009.
To further highlight the importance of crime, and in particular its differential role across establishment size, Table 2 provides mean statistics on crime broken down by small, medium and large establishments for South America (based on the definition for size in the WBES). While these raw statistics do not establish clear patterns across size, they point to crime having differential effects across establishment size. Specifically, it appears that large establishments are bigger targets for crime (based on incidence of crime) even though they are least affected by crime (based on whether crime is a major obstacle), relative to small and medium-size establishments. This may be because large establishments are more likely to buy private security. As a percentage of sales, crime losses and security expenditure is lowest among large establishments though this is due to higher sales more than anything else. To examine the importance of crime more carefully we begin by presenting a simple theory for crime and its link to establishment size. In the empirical analysis that follows we evaluate the relationship between crime and establishment size more systematically by controlling for establishment, industry and country-level characteristics.
Model
We consider an otherwise standard model of heterogeneous establishments/producers and incorporate a channel for crime as in . In our framework, establishment production is influenced by expected losses from crime. Establishment decisions are presented first, followed by the decision of an exogenous Crime Group that expropriates capital from establishments (crime). We focus on a static setting as it more naturally relates to the empirical analysis that follows. Moreover, we assume perfectly competitive markets and introduce crime as the only source of friction to highlight its importance.
Environment
Establishments differ across productivity ∈ and produce a homogeneous final good . Production technology is standard: = , 0 < < 1, where is capital used in production. We abstract from labor for simplicity. Establishments rent capital at a cost > 0. Differences in productivity are to capture establishment efficiency and/or demand for its goods. Since productivity is complementary in production, capital and output increase with productivity.
We allow for the possibility that a share of establishment capital is lost to crime. There are two factors that affect the likelihood an establishment faces crime: (1) an exogenous level of property rights--related to legal institutions and rule of law--common across establishments within an economy, and (2) establishment spending on private protection. We take the stance that stronger property rights and private protection reduce the likelihood of crime, all else equal. Specifically, an establishment faces crime with probability 1 − ( , ) ∈ [0, 1], where is a measure of property rights--the likelihood the state can prevent crime--and is establishment-level protection. 7 In what follows, we assume a functional form for ( , ) that is increasing in both arguments.
Crime and Establishment Decisions
The problem of an establishment is to choose protection--which lowers the probability of facing crime--and capital to maximize profit. For simplicity we assume a stand-in Crime Group with monopoly power that observes establishment decisions and chooses a fraction of capital to expropriate (details to follow). 8 Timing wise, establishment decisions are made first followed by the Crime Group's decisions. As such, establishment protection and capital decisions are influenced by expected losses from crime, or said differently, in anticipation of the Crime Group's best-response to its choices. Let ( , ) = − and ( , ) = − ( + ) represent establishment profit when it does not and does face crime, where ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of capital lost to crime. 9 An establishment with productivity chooses capital and protection to maximize expected profit in the following way:̃(
Equation (1) states that with probability ( , ) an establishment with productivity does not face crime and earns its full profit from production ( , ), and with probability 1 − ( , ) faces crime and earns ( , ). ( ) is the cost of buying protection which is increasing in . 10 This expression simplifies to imply an establishment earns its entire profit from production ( , ), less expected losses from crime (1 − ( , )) ; is capital lost to crime and 1 − ( , ) is the probability this happens. When property rights are very strong and/or if an establishment buys sufficient protection such that ( , ) = 1, there is no opportunity for crime. In this instance, establishment decisions become a standard one of choosing capital to maximize profit, the first-best scenario.
Next, we describe the decision of the Crime Group. They have full information concerning establishment capital and protection, and optimize by choosing how much to expropriate from each establishment.
11 Specifically, the problem for the Crime Group is
The expression in eq. (2) states the Crime Group expropriates an amount from an establishment with probability 1 − ( , ) and is unsuccessful with probability ( , ) earning zero. ( ) is the cost associated with crime which is increasing in --to steal/damage a higher fraction of capital, more resources must be spent by the Crime Group to successfully complete the task. Based on eq. (2) establishments that use more capital in production are a more lucrative target for crime; however, those that spend more on protection are much harder to expropriate. Understanding the trade-offs between crime, protection and capital demand, and how it varies across size is a topic we discuss in the following subsection.
We can now discuss the partial equilibrium implications for establishment production. Solving eq. (1) and taking crime and protection as given, optimal capital and output are * ( ) = ( + )
where ≡ (1 − ( , )) . Capital and output are the standard first-best values except for , a term which captures the expected share of capital lost to crime; is total expected losses from crime. Our theory implies:
i. ≤ 0: capital demand falls with expected share of capital lost to crime,
ii. ≤ 0: output falls with expected share of capital lost to crime.
We evaluate ( ) and ( ) in our empirical analysis: establishments that have a high expected share of capital lost to crime operate on a smaller scale--they use fewer inputs in production and produce less output--all else constant. Importantly, expected losses from crime can vary across establishments, within and across countries; within countries due to differences in productivity (which is linked to protection expenditure) and across countries due to differences in property rights .
Equilibrium
To examine the equilibrium implications of the model we take a stance on functional forms for ( , ), cost of buying protection ( ) and cost function for crime ( ). We assume ( , ) = + ∈ [0, 1], where > 0
. This implies protection and property rights are complementary and reduce the likelihood of crime, and the probability of facing crime is at most 1 − . 12 For the cost functions we assume ( ) = / , ( ) = / and set = = = = 2 to obtain closed-form solutions. (The main predictions that follow, in particular those depicted in Figure 1 , are robust to alternate parameter values.) Equilibrium solutions for protection and share of capital lost to crime, for any choice of capital, are
which implies larger establishments buy more protection and the share of capital lost to crime , is 'humpshaped' in . 13 Moreover, since in equilibrium more productive establishments use more capital in production, it follows that rises with and is hump-shaped in productivity. Using these solutions for and , we can numerically evaluate how expected losses from crime varies across establishment productivity/size and across economies that differ in property rights. Figure 1 displays expected share of capital lost to crime , and expected total losses from crime , across establishment productivity for specified parameters values. Expected losses are 'hump-shaped' in productivity (and capital) and expand outward as property rights weaken. Importantly, medium-size establishments have higher expected losses from crime than the smallest and largest establishments.
14 According to our theory, large establishments spend lots on protection which reduces expected losses, and small establishments use little capital in production and are not a lucrative target for crime. In contrast, medium-size establishments are most affected by crime because they use sufficient capital in production to warrant crime, yet find it unprofitable to buy adequate protection. As property rights weaken, these effects are magnified.
To provide further intuition for the patterns in Figure 1 , we evaluate analytically how expected losses from crime affect establishment capital. Substituting eq. (5) into eq. (1) and differentiating with respect to capital implies
where is the marginal product of capital and ( , ) ≥ 0 is a distortionary wedge on capital arising from crime. 15 When < 1, an environment where crime is possible, ( , ) is positive and hump-shaped in capital implying establishments choose capital below optimal capacity (since > ). And this is especially prominent among medium-size establishments. Put differently, establishments that anticipate significant losses from crime strategically lower inputs in production and operate on a smaller scale, and this is most evident among medium-size establishments, at least relative to the smallest and largest establishments. We test these predictions in what follows.
Data
Establishment-level data we use is from the WBES. The data is collected via face-to-face interviews, typically with the manager, to understand the major obstacles establishments face. A convenient feature of the survey is that it is administered in a similar form within continents which allows for cross-country comparisons. We restrict analysis to countries in South America to limit variation in institutional and cultural differences, and because crime is most prevalent in this region. 16 The initial rollout of the survey was conducted in 2003 with subsequent and more complete rollouts conducted within a three to four year span. To be comparable across countries we use the 2010 survey with the exception of Brazil which is from the 2009 survey.
The dataset includes establishments in manufacturing, service and other sectors (mostly construction and transport). The manufacturing sector accounts for over 70 percent of establishments and the service sector accounts for more than 20 percent. There are more than 20 classifications for industry ranging from food, textiles, chemicals (manufacturing related industries) to retail, hotels, restaurants and information technology (more service-oriented industries). About 85 percent of businesses are stand-alone (i.e. do not belong to a larger firm). The dataset includes general information related to the establishment (legal status, year it was formed), questions related to production (sales, operation costs) as well as specific questions related to distortions they face (e.g. access to licences, electricity, bank loans). We also know whether an establishment operates in a capital city and approximate population size: < 50, 50 − 250, 250 − 1000 and > 1000, in thousands of people. From our sample we exclude establishments who do not report values for sales, those who are deemed untruthful in their responses, as well as establishments above the 99th percentile for sales, labor, capital and protection expenditure, by country. In total we are left with over 6000 establishments in our sample: Argentina (792), Bolivia (167), Brazil (1523), Chile (877), Colombia (774), Ecuador (301), Paraguay (263), Peru (842), Uruguay (386) and Venezuela (153); Guyana and Suriname are excluded because they have fewer than 100 observations.
Empirical Strategy
Two central predictions based on our framework in Section 3 are (1) establishment size (capital and output) falls as expected losses from crime increase, and (2) the severity of this reduction varies across establishment size and is more prevalent among medium-size establishments; alternatively, is less acute among the smallest and largest establishments. To test these predictions we use versions of eqs. (3) and (4) which state inputs in production and/or output are positively related to productivity-specific factors and negatively related to the expected share of capital lost to crime. While in Section 3 capital is the only input in production, we note here that other inputs (e.g. labor) are also affected by crime if production technology is complementary in those inputs.
To test these predictions we need a measure for anticipated losses from crime, or alternatively, expectation of crime. We use an establishment's response to whether crime is a severe, major, moderate, minor or non-obstacle to business operation, which is an assessment of crime's impact on business operation--we refer to this as an establishment's crime expectation.
17 While this does not directly capture anticipated losses from crime, it does account for an establishment's belief or perception of the degree to which crime affects business operation and quite plausibly operation scale/size. Our underlying premise is that establishments that are most affected by crime (i.e. anticipate substantial losses from crime and therefore operate on a smaller scale) should report crime is a severe or major obstacle to business operation, and establishments that are less affected by crime should report crime is a minor or non-obstacle to operation. Indeed, crime expectation works well for our purposes because it captures an establishment's belief regarding the severity of crime irrespective of whether they are victims of crime, and thereby account for broader, more indirect consequences of crime among the entire sample of establishments. For instance, an establishment may reduce capital (or other inputs) if they anticipate a high likelihood of crime (crime expectation) even though they subsequently do not face crime. By using crime expectation we can account for strategic responses to crime that incidence or losses from crime may fail to capture.
We define crime expectation as an indicator-variable, equal to one if an establishment reports crime is a major or severe obstacle to business operation (high crime expectation) and zero otherwise (low crime expectation). We also consider a version where crime expectation is a continuous measure taking five possible values (from not an obstacle to severe obstacle). Our estimating equation is
where is an outcome of interest related to establishment size--sales, number of employees, annual cost of labor and capital expenditure--for establishment , in country , in industry and city . 18 are establishment specific characteristics related productivity, is an indicator for establishment crime expectation, are country-level fixed effects to broadly reflect measures of property rights and are industry fixed effects and city-level controls. Our variable of interest is
. Based on the model we expect 2 is negative--establishments that have high crime expectation operate on a smaller scale, all else equal--and that 2 has a smaller negative value for the smallest and largest establishments. To control for establishment-level productivity we use the top manager's experience in industry, number of employees when established, registration status (sole proprietorship, partnership, privately or publicly held) and whether the establishment is a stand-alone enterprise or part of a larger firm. We also include indicators for export status and R&D activity as they are often correlated with productivity (Aw, Roberts, and Xu 2011) . We control for over 20 classifications of industry to account for scale effects and because crime can be particular to select industries. Likewise, we control for city characteristics (categories for population size and whether a capital city) to account for demand side effects and because urban density may influence potential for crime (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999) .
Despite the variety of controls we account for, an obvious issue is that crime expectation is an endogenous outcome influenced by unobserved establishment specific factors. 19 The data we use prevents us from presenting a compelling exogenous measure for crime expectation, nor is this our primary aim. Instead, we evaluate a reduced form version of eq. (7) using average crime expectation at the country-industry-city level in place of establishment-level crime expectation. The rationale is that establishment-specific unobservables and/or outcomes should not influence average crime expectation, though it is possible the latter is linked to unobservables at the country-industry-city level that influence establishment behavior. 20 Nevertheless, average crime expectation may be a more accurate proxy for the criminal environment an establishment operates in and less affected by measurement error. At a minimum, the reduced form provides a sense of the severity of crime at the country-industry-city level on measures related to establishment size and serves as an additional test of our predictions.
Results
We begin by presenting OLS and Reduced Form (RF) results for crime expectation on measures related to establishment size. We then evaluate the differential role of crime expectation across size. Finally, we compare the importance of crime relative to other obstacles to business operation examined in the literature, in particular, access to finance, practises of the informal sector and corruption. Table 3 reports OLS estimates for crime expectation, coefficient 2 from eq. (7), for four variables related to establishment size: annual sales, number of full-time employees, annual cost of labor and annual capital expenditure (contingent on positive investment). Column (1) controls for country fixed effects, column (2) adds industry and city fixed effects, and column (3) adds establishment specific controls for productivity. All results are estimated with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry-city level. The estimates for crime expectation on measures related to establishment size are overwhelmingly negative and significant; that is, establishments who report high crime expectation operate on a smaller scale. 21 For example, regression estimates reported in column 3, which includes all controls, show that establishments who report high crime expectation have 22 percent fewer sales, on average, than establishments who report low crime expectation. 22 Continuing in column (3), high crime expectation establishments also hire 12 percent fewer full-time workers (employees) and spend about 20 percent less on wages (annual cost of labor), where the former and latter relate to the quantity and quality of workforce.
Crime Expectation and Establishment Size
RF results are reported in Table 4 which measures the relationship between average crime expectation at the country-industry-city level and establishment size. The estimates for sales, employees, annual cost of labor and annual capital expenditure are all negative and significant under all specifications. In particular, estimates in Column (3) imply that a 10 percent increase in average crime expectation is associated with a reduction in sales by 5.3 percent and full-time employees by 4.1 percent; annual spending on labor and capital are about 4.5 percent lower. Overall, OLS and RF estimates support the view that high crime expectation is associated with lower establishment size, at least for measures related to sales, labor and capital. We also use crime expectation as a continuous variable taking five possible values--severe, major, moderate, minor or non-obstacle to business operation--and find similar results to those presented in Table 3 and Table 4 ; that is, higher measures/indices of crime expectation are associated with lower establishment size (see Table 10 in Appendix). We also consider several robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of our results. We report these in Table 11 in the Appendix and briefly discuss them here. First, we restrict our sample to establishments that did not face crime--about 2/3 of the sample--to ensure our results are not driven by establishments who are victims of crime that report high crime expectation. Second, because crime expectation is a subjective measure we account for whether a manager is a complainer, similar to the approach in Gaviria (2002) , to control for manager biases that may be skewing our results. Third, we exclude observations for Brazil since they account for over 25 percent of the sample and have high rates of crime. Finally, we add observations for Mexican establishments since crime is highly prevalent in several major cities there. In each of these specifications we find consistent evidence that high crime expectation is associated with lower establishment size. 
Crime Expectation across Establishment Size
The second prediction we test is that the severity of crime is differentially associated with establishment size. Specifically, based on our theoretical framework in Section 3, the severity of crime initially rises with size and falls as establishments become very big. That is to say, the smallest and largest establishments are less affected by crime than all other (or medium size) establishments. To test this prediction we estimate eq. (7) by interacting crime expectation with dummy variables for whether an establishment is small, medium or large (based on number of full-time employees). Table 5 reports OLS and RF results when crime expectation is interacted with establishment size; small, medium and large establishments are defined as having less than 10, between 10 to less than 250, and 250 or more employees. We choose these definitions for size as a benchmark to evaluate the importance of crime expectation across establishment size. We focus on sales and annual cost of labor as outcome variables of interest and report size interactions relative to small establishments. (The correlation between sales and employees, and annual cost of labor and employees, in logs is 0.60 and 0.42, respectively.) To find evidence in support of our theory, the coefficient on the medium size interaction term should be: (1) negative--crime expectation is negatively associated with medium-size establishments relative to small establishments, and (2) negative, and larger in absolute value, than the coefficient on the large size interaction--crime expectation has a larger negative association with medium size establishments than large establishments. This is precisely what we find for (1) in our estimates for sales and annual cost of labor, where the medium size interaction is negative and statistically significant under both OLS and RF. For (2), the medium size interaction has a larger negative coefficient than the large size interaction for sales but not for annual cost of labor (though they are not statistically different). 24 Overall, our results support that crime expectation has a differential relationship across establishment size, and to an extent is less acute among the smallest and largest establishments. While Table 5 shows this pattern holds for medium-size establishments defined as having between 10 and 250 employees, in the Appendix we show that differential links are evident for other definitions of size as well. 
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Crime and Other Distortions
Crime expectation is negatively associated with establishment outcomes. While crime is a severe problem in South America, it is merely one among myriad distortions establishments face in day-to-day operations. For instance, access to finance is identified as a major impediment to business expansion and operation (Buera, Kaboski, and Shin 2011; Kalemli-Ozcan and Sorensen 2016) . Likewise, several studies show the informal sector can be a drag on formal establishments (D'Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo 2012; LaPorta and Shleifer 2014) and corruption in the form of paying-off bureaucrats to obtain permits can limit growth potential (Shleifer and Vishny 1998) . While crime is a severe distortion, does it remain important for understanding establishment size when evaluated with these distortions emphasised in the literature? Ideal for our analysis is the WBES provides comparable "expectation" data on a range of distortions/obstacles that influence establishment size. Similar to crime, establishments report whether a given distortion is a severe, major, moderate, minor or non-obstacle to business operation. Together with crime, we focus on corruption, access to finance and practices of the informal sector to examine their importance on measures related to establishment size. We define "expectation" variables for these distortions similar to crime expectation--for example, we set "corruption expectation" equal to one if an establishment reports corruption is a major or severe obstacle to business operation, and zero otherwise. We then re-estimate eq. (7) by including these additional distortions. Table 6 reports OLS and RF results for these four distortions on sales, labor and annual cost of labor.
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There are several points worth highlighting. First, each of these distortions have negative coefficients--i.e. are negatively associated with establishment size--and are statistically significant for the most part. Second, even after controlling for corruption, access to finance and informal sector practices, crime expectation remains statistically significant and negatively associated with lower establishment size, under both OLS and RF. Third, crime has a larger negative association with establishment size than corruption--as implied by the coefficient magnitudes (and statistically significant in some instances). This is consistent with the findings in Pearlman (2014) who examines crime and corruption incidence among micro-enterprises in Mexico, and Gaviria (2002) who uses an earlier version of the Enterprise Surveys. The estimates also suggest that crime is as important as the informal sector and finance are for sales and annual cost of labor, and more strongly associated with employees than finance is based on the RF estimate (i.e. statistically different). From a policy perspective, our results reveal that crime is an equally important detriment to business performance as these other distortions examined in the literature, at least in South America. Moreover, given that improving access to finance is a policy tool often emphasised for development, our results imply that policies that strive to lower crime can have a major role in spurring enterprise. Each column reports point estimates for a dependent variable of interest. Crime expectation is an indicator for whether an establishment reports crime is a major or severe obstacle to business operation. Corruption, Finance and Informal sector expectation are defined similarly. RF estimates are based on average expectation of a given distortion at the country-industry-city level. Sales, Employees and (Annual) Cost of Labor are in logs. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry-city level, are in parenthesis. * * * , * * , * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
Conclusion
In this paper we document that crime is a frequent occurrence and a major obstacle to doing business in South America. We present a simple theory that accounts for the role of crime on establishment inputs in production and overall output. Our theory predicts that establishments strategically under-produce to mitigate losses from crime and this is most evident among medium-size establishments. To test these predictions, we estimate the importance of establishment-level crime expectation on measures related to size, and a RF version using average crime expectation. Both OLS and RF estimates reveal high crime expectation is negatively associated with establishment size, and robust to a variety of specifications. We also find that crime expectation has differential links to establishment size, and in particular, is more negatively associated with sales and inputs in production among medium size establishments, relative to small and large establishments.
In our analysis we have not focused on identifying the causal effect of crime expectation on establishment size. This has allowed us to take a broader scope and highlight the importance of crime across the entire size distribution of establishments for understanding business performance in South America. More importantly, we are able to evaluate the importance of crime relative to other distortions emphasised in the literature, notably access to finance, corruption and practises of the informal sector, and show that crime is equally, if not more important for understanding establishment performance. Evaluating the effects of various programs that aim to address these respective issues and its subsequent impact on establishment outcomes can provide more in-depth insight for understanding the major and pressing constraints for economic development. Table 7 presents correlations for protection spending and crime expectation on establishment size (sales, employees, annual cost of labor and annual capital expenditure). Spending on protection is positively correlated with establishment size. For crime expectation and size there are no clear patterns. Table 8 reports correlations between crime expectation and whether an establishment is a victim of crime. Column variables are in logs. Annual Capital Expenditure is restricted to establishments that have positive investment. Protection spending is in logs, and (0/1) is a dummy variable for whether an establishment buys protection. Crime expectation (0 − 4) represents an establishment's response to whether crime, theft and disorder are not an obstacle, a minor, moderate, major and severe obstacle to business operation. An establishment has 'high' crime expectation if they report major or severe, and 'low' otherwise. = 5610. Crime Expectation is defined as in Table 7 . Victim of crime is whether an establishment faced crime in the past year. = 6034.
In Section 2 we report mean descriptive statistics for crime across establishment size based on the definition for size used in the WBES. Table 9 reports these same statistics based on the definition for size used in Section 6.2. Notes: Small, medium and large establishments are defined as having less than 10, between 10 to 249, and 250 or more employees, in line with the definition used in Section 6.2. Incidence of Crime and Bought Security are averages based on indicators for whether an establishment faced crime and bought private security in the respective year. Table 10 reports results when crime expectation is a continuous measure taking five possible values, where both OLS and RF estimates are presented. These results are analogous to the ones presented in Table 3 and Table 4 where crime expectation is a dummy variable (high or low). 
B Robustness Checks
To evaluate whether our central findings are robust to alternate specifications we estimate four separate models by OLS and RF with a full set of controls. Table 11 reports the results. In our estimates we have used crime expectation as an independent variable, the rationale being that it accounts for the wider role of crime, including establishments that did not face crime. In our sample about one-third of establishments report facing crime and so it is possible the negative associations we found in Section 6.1 are driven by these establishments. To address this, Column (1) reports estimates for crime expectation on measures related to establishment size when the sample is restricted to establishments that did not face crime. The coefficients are negative and significant implying that even among establishments that are not victims of crime, high crime expectation is associated with lower measures of establishment size. Each cell reports point estimates from a separate regression where all controls are included. Column (1) restricts the sample to establishments that did not face crime in the previous year, column (2) includes controls for whether a manager is a complainer, column (3) excludes observations for Brazil and column (4) adds observations for Mexico. OLS results are based on whether crime expectation is a major or severe obstacle to business operation (indicator variable). RF results is when average crime expectation at the country-industry-city level is used as the independent variable. Dependent variables are in logs and Annual Capital Expenditure is restricted to establishments that have positive investment. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry-city level, are in parenthesis. * * * , * * , * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
Another concern is that crime expectation is a subjective measure and our estimates may reflect manager biases. It is possible that managers who report high crime expectation may be overly pessimistic or low quality managers such that the role of crime expectation on establishment size reflects weak management more than anything else. For instance, a low quality manager might report high crime expectation to justify poor performance, or alternatively, not fully understand the environment and over or understate the severity of crime. In our regressions we attempt to control for manager quality by including the top manager's experience in industry. We now attempt to control for whether a manager's pessimism is driving our results by including a measure for whether a manager is a complainer, as in Gaviria (2002) . Specifically, we define a manager as a complainer if their response to whether transportation and political instability are major obstacles to business operation both exceed the averages of what all managers in their country-industry-city report. The rationale is that political instability and transportation are ubiquitous issues, and should be fairly common across establishments within a country-industry-city and not specific to an establishment. Thus, if a manager's response to both of these questions exceed the country-industry-city average we define them as a 'complainer'. Column (2) reports our results when we include a dummy variable for whether a manager is a complainer. The results for crime expectation remain negative and significant.
We also re-estimate crime expectation excluding observations for Brazil (Column 3). Brazil accounts for about 25 percent of our sample and close to 70 percent of establishments in Brazil report high crime expectation. Hence, it is possible that our results are driven by Brazilian establishments. We find that all coefficients retain the expected sign when Brazil is excluded, however, due to the drop in the size of RF estimates, only OLS estimates remain statistically significant. This may imply that establishment level performance in Brazil is more closely linked to the crime expectation of counterpart establishments (proxied by our industry-city-country groupings) than other South American establishments in the sample, which affects the magnitude, but not overall direction, of the RF estimates. Lastly, in Column 4 we include observations for Mexico in our regressions given that crime is fairly prevalent in many regions in this country. Estimates of crime expectation on measures related to size remain negative and statistically significant when Mexico is included. Taken together, our results show that crime expectation is negatively associated with sales, number of full-time employees, annual cost of labor and capital expenditure.
C Crime and Size Interaction --Alternate Definitions for Size
In Section 6.2 we evaluate the role of crime across small, medium and large establishments when we define a medium establishment as one that has between 10 to 249 employees. Table 12, Table 13 and Table 14 consider alternate definitions for a medium size establishment. A medium size establishment is defined as having between 10 to 75 full-time employees. Each column reports estimates from a separate regression. OLS results report when crime expectation is an indicator for whether an establishment reports crime is a major or severe obstacle to business operation. RF results report when average crime expectation at the country-industry-city level is the independent variable. All dependent variables are in logs. Number of observations for Sales and Annual Cost of Labor are 6034 and 5610. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry-city level, are in parenthesis. * * * , * * , * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. A medium size establishment is defined as having between 10 to 150 full-time employees. Each column reports estimates from a separate regression. OLS results report when crime expectation is an indicator for whether an establishment reports crime is a major or severe obstacle to business operation. RF results report when average crime expectation at the country-industry-city level is the independent variable. All dependent variables are in logs. Number of observations for Sales and Annual Cost of Labor are 6034 and 5610. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry-city level, are in parenthesis. * * * , * * , * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. We also recognize that crime expectation is a subjective measure and prone to limitations typically found in subjective measures. For our purposes, crime expectation is based on manager responses so it should be more in-line with a rational-agent framework than standard household surveys that include subjective measures. Managers play a central role guiding business performance (Bloom et al. 2013) and relevant for our analysis is whether crime expectation affects establishment behavior, whether real or imagined. Nevertheless, we evaluate the sensitivity of this in our robustness checks. 20 See for instance Fisman and Svensson (2007) who use industry-city averages of corruption as an instrument to estimate its effect on establishment growth. See also who follows a similar approach for incidence of crime on establishment growth. 21 It is also the case that spending on protection and establishment size are positively correlated, as reported in the Appendix. 22 The estimating equation is semi-log so the magnitude for coefficient is (exp( ) − 1) × 100. 23 When establishments in Brazil are excluded the OLS estimates do not change all that much; however, RF estimates are smaller in magnitude and not significant, though they still exhibit a negative sign (see Table 11 and discussion in the Appendix). 24 For annual capital expenditure, we find differential links across size though there are no clear patterns nor are the estimates statistically significant for the most part. 25 The general predictions of our theory hold when the lower bound for a medium-size establishment does not exceed 15 employees and the upper bound does not fall below 100 employees. As these lower and upper bounds change, differential patterns across size are not as clear or robust. 26 For the RF regressions, we use average corruption, finance and informal sector expectation at the country-industry-city level, respectively, similar to what we do for crime.
